India’s Chip Ambitions After the Hormuz Shock
India’s new assembly and packaging plants are beginning to ship chips. After years of announcements, there is something tangible to point to. Yet opening a plant brings another question into view: will the materials it needs keep arriving?
Hormuz has made that question urgent. Indian households feel the crisis through fuel prices and cooking gas. Inside a chip plant, the pressure travels through less familiar supplies—industrial gases, chemical feedstocks and the shipping routes that bring them to the factory.
A year ago, I asked whether India could build a semiconductor manufacturing ecosystem. The commercial launches since then give grounds for confidence. As the country prepares for larger wafer fabs, though, it needs to look further upstream. A factory can be ready while a qualified supplier, a cargo or an export licence is still missing. [1, 2]
India is beginning to deliver
By September 2026, five of the twelve projects approved under Semicon 1.0 had entered commercial operation. Micron, Kaynes Semicon and CG Semi are in Sanand; CDIL is in Mohali, and Suchi Semicon is in Gujarat. These new facilities mainly assemble, test and package chips, including discrete devices. [2–5]
| Project | Location | Reported milestone |
| Micron | Sanand, Gujarat | Assembly and test facility opened on 28 February 2026 |
| Kaynes Semicon | Sanand, Gujarat | Commercial production launched on 31 March 2026 |
| CG Semi | Sanand, Gujarat | G1 OSAT commercial production began on 4 July 2026 |
| CDIL | Mohali, Punjab | New commercial production line inaugurated in September 2026 |
| Suchi Semicon | Surat district, Gujarat | Commercial production line inaugurated in September 2026 |
Project milestones: references 2–5. The five-unit count refers to projects under Semicon 1.0, rather than every semiconductor facility in India.
India already fabricates wafers at the government’s Semi-Conductor Laboratory in Mohali. Its 8-inch line uses 180-nanometre CMOS technology. Tata Electronics’ project at Dholera is a much larger commercial undertaking: a 300-mm silicon wafer fab being developed with PSMC. That is the distinction behind the description of Dholera as India’s first commercial 300-mm silicon fab. [6, 7]
Assembly and test plants work with chips that have already been fabricated. A wafer fab creates the devices through successive processing steps on the wafer itself. Progress in packaging is therefore welcome, but it leaves the harder questions about Dholera’s process readiness, yields and material supplies open.
In my October 2025 article, late-2026 wafer output was a target. Dholera remains under development. Even when the first trial wafers emerge, the work of reaching consistent commercial output at acceptable yields will continue. Reliable utilities and qualified suppliers will be part of that work. [1, 7]

Figure 1 India’s chip plants and the distinction between packaging and wafer fabrication
The Gulf supplies more than fuel
Shipping through Hormuz was still severely disrupted in late September. How severely is harder to capture in a single percentage. Windward’s analysis shows that vessels sailing with their automatic identification systems switched off can make visible crossing counts understate actual activity. Counting ships also tells us less than measuring their cargoes about how much material is getting through. [8]
For a chipmaker, the immediate concern is the delivery it is waiting for. Will the cargo arrive on time, and will the material still meet the required specification?
Before the disruption, Qatar supplied roughly one-third of the world’s helium. The gas is recovered during natural gas processing, so its availability depends on infrastructure built primarily for another product. The Gulf also supplies sulphur, used to make sulphuric acid. WEF’s April assessment estimated that nearly half of global seaborne sulphur trade passed through Hormuz. LNG disruption adds pressure on energy costs and industrial operations. These figures show the scale of global exposure; an Indian fab’s dependence will turn on its own suppliers and contracts. [9]
Qatar’s shutdown and the obstacles to shipping affected supplies broadly. Some damage will take longer to overcome. Repairs to particular LNG infrastructure were reported to require three to five years, with QatarEnergy estimating a 14% reduction in annual helium exports. An open shipping route would help, but it cannot repair damaged production equipment. [10]
Bromine has a different regional geography. Semiconductor-grade hydrogen bromide is used in plasma etching, and Israel and Jordan are major bromine producers. Together they accounted for about 69% of reported 2024 output excluding US production, according to USGS. Concentration of supply matters here too, although the transport routes differ from those through Hormuz. [11–13]
A substitute has to earn its place in a fab
A fab cannot simply buy whatever chemical happens to be available. Its materials have tightly defined specifications. A lower-purity gas or a broadly similar chemical may introduce contamination that affects device performance and yield. Purity has to survive storage, transport and delivery to the process tool. [14]
Finding another supplier is only the start. Its material must be qualified for the process in which it will be used, and that takes time. How much time varies by material and application. The practical lesson is to do this work before a shortage forces the issue.
Packaging plants have dependencies of their own. Conventional assembly and testing differ from wafer fabrication, while advanced packaging can involve demanding chemical processing. The exposure changes with the technology; packaging should not be treated as a single, lightly exposed category.
There is another complication upstream. Gallium and germanium can be recovered from nonferrous-metal processing; helium recovery depends on suitable gas streams and processing facilities. Semiconductor buyers may urgently need more supply, but their demand alone cannot determine how quickly those larger industries can provide it. [15, 16]
What the China numbers tell us
China’s position in several mineral supply chains is formidable. USGS reports that it accounted for approximately 99% of global primary gallium production in 2024. The word “primary” matters: this is a production figure, rather than a measure of every subsequent purification stage or finished semiconductor material. [17]
Takshashila’s analysis of 2019–24 trade data found that China supplied an average 76% of India’s silicon imports, 85.6% of its bismuth imports and 42.4% of its graphite imports. Those historical shares reveal concentrated sourcing. They do not tell us what proportion of an Indian fab’s purchases comes from China today. [18]
Silicon illustrates the gap. Between imported silicon material and a wafer ready for fabrication lies a chain of purification, crystal growth and processing. Shin-Etsu describes production through extremely pure polycrystalline silicon to single-crystal wafers. To understand a fab’s vulnerability, we need to know who supplies its qualified wafers as well as where the upstream silicon originates. [19]
Permanent magnets offer a more specific example. PIB reports that China accounted for 60–80% of India’s rare-earth permanent-magnet imports by value and 85–90% by quantity over 2022–25. Those figures apply to magnets, rather than the whole range of rare-earth materials. [20]
Then there are export rules. China’s July 2026 temporary helium export ban is confirmed by its official notice. China also describes itself as a major helium importer. The ban’s direct effect on India therefore depends on the trade and supplier relationships involved. China’s dominance in other minerals is no guide to its role in helium exports. [21, 22]
Specified October 2025 export-control measures remain suspended until 10 November 2026. Earlier rare-earth licensing requirements are separate from that suspension. A buyer has to check the particular product, technology, destination and end use covered by each rule. There is no single switch that turns all these controls on or off together. [23, 24]

Figure 2 China dependence figures with their product categories and reference periods
The supplier ecosystem is taking shape
Semicon 2.0’s approved programme outlay of ₹1,27,500 crore includes a dedicated machines-and-materials pillar, alongside support for design, fabrication, packaging, research and talent. The policy now gives more attention to the industries around the plants. The outlay is a programme commitment; it should not be read as money already disbursed. [2, 25]
September’s supplier agreements could help turn that commitment into capacity. Tata Electronics and Fujifilm signed an MoU focused on materials supply and localisation. Tata’s agreement with Sumitomo Chemical explores supply arrangements and possible local manufacture. Its partnership with Sojitz and NRS addresses the supply and storage of semiconductor materials. [26–28]
The agreements are encouraging. The evidence of reduced import dependence will come later, when facilities are commissioned, customers qualify the materials and dependable deliveries begin.
The National Critical Mineral Mission offers a broader policy framework. Approved in January 2025, it envisages government expenditure of ₹16,300 crore and expected investment of ₹18,000 crore by public-sector enterprises and other stakeholders over seven years. It covers exploration, processing, recycling, overseas assets and supply security. [29]
The ₹7,280 crore permanent-magnet scheme and proposed rare-earth corridors in Odisha, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu add to that effort. What they contribute to chipmaking will depend on their eventual products. India still needs separate plans for qualified wafers, electronic gases and process chemicals. [20]
Where policy should go next
I would put four tasks near the top of the agenda. These are recommendations for reducing disruption risk while domestic capabilities develop.
Work out what needs to be held in reserve
A reserve should begin with a supply audit. For each material, India needs to establish expected consumption, replenishment time and the availability of qualified alternatives. Public stocks, inventory held by suppliers and contracted supply coverage can all help, but they provide different kinds of protection.
Helium deserves particular attention. The audit should establish usable stocks and consumption across sectors, so the resulting policy takes account of industrial demand and other essential users.
Storage will require engineering as well as funding. Compressed-gas and cryogenic systems have different costs and handling requirements. A helium reserve must preserve purity, manage losses and meet applicable safety and licensing requirements. [30, 31]
Bring semiconductor gases into supply planning
Helium is absent from India’s published list of thirty critical minerals. That does not place it outside every relevant policy. It does, however, make explicit treatment of semiconductor gases in supply-security planning worth pursuing. [32]
The semiconductor mission, industrial-gas suppliers and relevant ministries could jointly identify vulnerable inputs, qualified sources and contingency arrangements. They should also be clear about what domestic gas infrastructure can deliver. Conventional air separation supplies nitrogen, oxygen and argon; helium requires a different recovery and sourcing chain. [16, 33]
Recovery and reuse deserve support where the technology and economics work. Incentives should follow demonstrated performance, with targets suited to the processes and gas streams involved.
Carry recovery through to a usable product
Recovering a metal from refinery residue is an early step. A semiconductor customer needs a consistent product, which means further separation, purification and quality control. Support for Indian projects should extend through that work. [15]
Pilot recovery, scale-up and customer qualification are all worth funding. Purchase commitments could strengthen the investment case where suitable buyers exist. Before making them, though, the government and companies need to match the proposed material to the technology that will use it. Gallium and germanium will not serve every silicon fab’s requirements.
Resources in the ground also need to be assessed realistically. India’s identified monazite resources contain substantial rare-earth oxide equivalents, but commercially recoverable supply depends on more than that quantity. Monazite contains thorium, bringing radiation protection and radioactive-waste requirements into processing decisions. [34, 35]
Qualify alternative sources before they are needed
Long-term contracts with qualified suppliers in different regions can reduce exposure while domestic projects mature. The independence of those sources needs checking. Two distributors drawing from the same production site can leave a buyer exposed to the same outage.
Contracts should cover delivery routes and quality, allocation during shortages, and arrangements for recovering from interruption. Additional costs may be involved. They should be weighed against the consequences of a missed delivery, with a clear understanding of the protection being purchased.

Figure 3 Four recommended actions to reduce material supply risks
A plant opening is the beginning
India has good reason to take confidence from its commercial launches. Part of the programme is now producing. Hormuz has shown how much work remains upstream, especially as new wafer-fabrication capacity approaches a commercial ramp.
That work is specific. A fab needs to know where each critical input originates, how it is processed, who can supply it to specification and how long replenishment takes. Those answers will tell us more about resilience than a broad claim of mineral independence.
There is still time to build that knowledge into procurement and policy. India has worked hard to bring its chip ambitions this far. Keeping the plants supplied deserves the same attention.
Information reviewed as of 3 October 2026. Historical figures retain their stated reference periods. Supply conditions, project schedules and export rules may change; the recommendations above are the author’s assessment.
References
Numbered references correspond to the citations in the article. Links were reviewed during the fact-check on 3 October 2026. Official sources and company disclosures establish announced status; they do not independently verify operational performance. Policy proposals and explicitly identified assessments are the author’s own.
[1] Amulya Charan. India’s Semiconductor Mission Can We Build a Chip Manufacturing Ecosystem. 3 October 2025; webpage displays an April 2026 update. Source
[2] PIB and MeitY. SEMICON India 2026 Concludes Successfully. 19 September 2026. Five operational units, twelve approved projects and Semicon 2.0 outlay. Source
[3] Micron. Micron Celebrates Opening of India’s First Semiconductor Assembly and Test Facility. 28 February 2026. Source
[4] PIB and Prime Minister’s Office. Address at the inauguration of Kaynes semiconductor plant. 31 March 2026. Source
[5] CG Power and CG Semi. CG Semi commences commercial production at its G1 OSAT facility in Sanand Gujarat. 4 July 2026. Source
[6] Semi-Conductor Laboratory. CMOS Fabrication Facility. Existing 8-inch 180-nm CMOS line. Source
[7] Tata Electronics. Semiconductor Foundry. Dholera 300-mm fab under development with PSMC. Source
[8] Windward. Is Iran Losing Its Grip on Strait of Hormuz Traffic. Late-September 2026 analysis of visible transits and cargo movements. Source
[9] World Economic Forum. The Strait of Hormuz crisis affects more than just oil Here are 9 other commodities. 1 April 2026. Source
[10] Associated Press. Iran war halts Qatar helium output threatening global tech supply chains. March 2026 reporting on QatarEnergy’s shutdown and estimated export reduction. Source
[11] Air Liquide. Hydrogen Bromide. Semiconductor plasma-etching application. Source
[12] US Geological Survey. Israel. 2024 bromine share excludes US production. Source
[13] US Geological Survey. Jordan. 2024 bromine share excludes US production. Source
[14] Entegris. Ensuring Purity and Safety How to Select the Right Container System for Safe Clean Chemical Delivery. Source
[15] Recovery and separation of gallium III and germanium IV from zinc refinery residues Part I Leaching and iron III removal. Hydrometallurgy research paper. Source
[16] Linde Engineering. Helium Recovery and Liquefaction Plants. Natural-gas recovery and purification. Source
[17] US Geological Survey. China. Mineral production shares including primary gallium in 2024. Source
[18] Rakshith Shetty and Takshashila Institution. Assessing the Nature of India’s Critical Minerals Vulnerabilities vis-à-vis China. 17 December 2024. Analysis of 2019–24 trade data. Source
[19] Shin-Etsu Chemical. Silicon Wafers. Technical description of semiconductor-grade wafer manufacture. Source
[20] PIB. India’s Rare Earth Strategy Manufacturing Corridors and Global Integration. 2 February 2026. Magnet imports, scheme and corridors. Source
[21] China MOFCOM and General Administration of Customs. Announcement 29 of 2026. Temporary helium export ban. 10 July 2026. Chinese original. Source
[22] China MOFCOM. Official response explaining the temporary helium export ban and China’s import position. Source
[23] China MOFCOM and General Administration of Customs. Announcement 70 of 2025. Suspension of specified measures until 10 November 2026. 7 November 2025. Chinese original. Source
[24] China MOFCOM and General Administration of Customs. Announcement 18 of 2025. Controls on specified medium and heavy rare-earth items. 4 April 2025. Source
[25] PIB and MeitY. Union Minister Ashwini Vaishnaw addressed media on Semicon 2.0. 31 August 2026. Six-pillar framework and notifications. Source
[26] Tata Electronics and Fujifilm. Strategic partnership to accelerate semiconductor materials ecosystem in India. 17 September 2026. Source
[27] Tata Electronics and Sumitomo Chemical. MoU for high-quality semiconductor materials. 18 September 2026. Source
[28] Tata Electronics Sojitz and NRS. Partnership to develop semiconductor materials supply chain for Dholera fab. 18 September 2026. Source
[29] Ministry of Mines and PIB. Cabinet approval of National Critical Mineral Mission. 29 January 2025. Official release reproduced by Ministry of Mines. Source
[30] Petroleum and Explosives Safety Organisation. Gas Cylinders Rules 2016. Official rules page. Source
[31] US National Institutes of Health. Compressed Gas and Cryogen Safety Guidelines. General hazard and handling guidance; not an Indian legal source. Source
[32] Ministry of Mines and PIB. Thirty Critical Minerals List Released. July 2023. Source
[33] Air Products. Annual report statement distinguishing atmospheric gases recovered from air from helium purchased or refined from crude helium. Source
[34] Department of Atomic Energy and PIB. Official statement of identified rare-earth resources. March 2026. Source
[35] Atomic Energy Regulatory Board. Management of Radioactive Waste from Mining and Milling of Uranium and Thorium. Safety guide covering monazite processing. Source